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1, Introduction
Projeto Grafico
José Antonio de Oliveira In his book The WorkofNations, Robert Reich highlights one ofEetoracae Hletr6nica the most compelling characteristics ofour times: the survival ofalias national States within the framework of a global economy.
Célio de Almeida Mentor ¢ Ronel José Gomes “Each nation’s primary political task will be to cope with the
centrifugal forces of the global economy whichtear althe ties
bindingcilizens together - bestowing ever greater wealth on the
mostskilled and insightful, while consigningthe less skilled to
a declining standardofliving. As borders become ever more
 
Ficha Catalografica meaningless in economic terms,thosecitizens best posilioned
ARAU 5 to thrive in the world market are tempted to slip the bonds of
QUISHOE Pays He. national allegiance, and by so doing disengage themselves from
‘The Scope for Industrial Policy In a Free Trade Environment / their less favored fellows (p.3).”José Tavares de AraujoJr. - Rio de Janetro: UFRJ/IEI, 1993.




19- integration, the Uruguay Roundof Multilateral Negotiations of1. Bibllografia: p. 19-20. the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the1. Politica Industrial. 2. Relagoes Econémicas Internacionals. 3. constant mutations in the time-honored battle between freeComercio Internacional - Politica governamental traders and protectionists. From the perspective of industrial
+ organization,it appears underthe format ofanintricate challenge
for policy makers. Duringthe last 20 years, technical progress
has allowed a dramatic reduction in the costs of information
and data processing, through innovations such as personal
fo [7 GL compulers, modems, and fax machines. These technologiesData:#2|40(76 form the core of the present trend towardsglobalization, that
signifies, among other things, a standardization of business
practices and expectations. Until recently, only transnational
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corporations were able to maintain weekly contacts with their
clients and partnersin different countries. Today, small firms
have on line accessto international data banks, and can watch
the daily behavior of their foreign competitors. In this context,
several conventional instrumentsofindustrialpolicy (such as
tariffs, quotas, and capital controls) become anachronismsthat
are incompatible with the material base ofcontemporary society,
Theyare either worthless or unnecessary sources ofcommercial
complaints at home and abroad.
However, the continual re-creation of uneven condilions of
competition is intrinsic to technical progress, and this
characteristic hasbeen particularly intense in the recent past.
This generates two sourcesofprotectionist pressures. On the
one hand, innovating firms lobbyfor regulationsthatwill allow
them to extend the period during which they can extract
schumpeterian rents from their new technologies. Such
regulations seldom imply explicit barriers to merchandise trade,
but to the knowledge embodiedin the innovations,i.e., legislation
on patents, trade marks,licensing, and other instruments to
preserveintellectual property. On the other hand,industries
that suddenly became obsolete push for temporary relief, in
orderto restructure and regain international competitiveness.
Thus, while the gains from global competition become more
appealing, domestic industries press their governments for
privileges in order to enter into that game. This is the
contemporary dilemma of industrial policy: How to create
special conditions for capital accumulation at home, without
establishingdirect constraints onthe international movements
of citizens, goods, and financial resources?
The objective of this paper is to discuss the industrial policy
dilemmain three steps. Thefirst, presented in section 2, is a
brief inquiry on the analytical instruments that explain theprocess of competition in a global economy.It will be argued
that Ronald Coase’sclassical paperon “Thenatureof the firm"
(1937) providesa basictool to deal with corporationstrategies,
4
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namely, the interplay between the costs of production and
transaction. As Coase’s approach is complementary to the
theories on contestable markets andschumpeterian competition,
his contribution can be integrated into a general framework
thatcovers the two relevant themesofanystudyon international
competitiveness: the firm and the industry structure. The
second andthird steps, presented in sections 3 and 4, refer,
respectively, to the domestic and the international dimensions
of the industrial policy dilemma. The essenceof the argument
to be madeis that, nowadays,every country - whateverils size
or developmentstage - mustcarry outits public policies under
constraints imposed by global competition. Whatvaries among
nationsIs their ability to draw a clear cut border-line between
homework and international bargaining. The Ppaper’s main
conclusions are summarized in section 5.
2, Intelligentfirms,sustainable configurations andschumpeterian
competition
A convincing explanation for the managerial innovations that
have been changing the competition patterns of the world
economy since the mid-eighties was provided, although
indirectly, by Coase, in 1937. His paper on “The nature of the
firm” contains an insightful answerto three basic questionsfor
the theory of industrial organization: why firms exist, what
determines the numberof firms and what determines firms’
activities. His answer is well known: it all depends on the
relation between production costs and transaction costs.
Transaction costs, in Carl Dahlman’s neat definition, are
“search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs,
policing and enforcementcosts (1979, p. 148)”. Thus, as Coase
restated recently, “although production could be carried out in
a completely decentralized way by meansofcontracts between
individuals, the fact thatit costs somethingto enter into these
transactions means thal firms will emerge to organize what
would otherwise be market transactions whenevertheir costs
were less than the costs of carrying out the transactions
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through the market. The limit to the size of the firm is set where
its costs oforganizing a transaction become equal to the cost of
carrying it out through the market. This determines whatthe
firm buys, produces andsells (1988, p.7).”
The ratio between production costs and transaction costs
is a
direct function of existing technologies. Whenever tec
hnical
progress reduces more intensively the former than thelat
ter
type of costs, the likely trend will be towards larger fir
ms,
vertical integration, and economic concentration, an
d vice-
versa. In the recent past, as the rate of inno
vations has been
similar inboth directions, aratherpeculiarsituati
on is emerging.
On the one hand, new economiesofscale a
re pushing towards
a greater internationalization ofproduction
lines. On the other.
diminishing informationcosts are gene
rating neweconomies Oo
scope, i.e., new opportunities for
rearrangingproductionvec ors.
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main strategic weapon is human capital. They constitute a
contemporary illustration of Coase’s approach.
Although no general survey has been published yet, there isa
flourishing literature on the diffusion ofmanagerial innovations
inspired by the notion of“intelligent” enterprises, and on the
new roles for small and medium firms in the world economy.
However, it is interesting to notice that this literature also
registers the revitalization of large corporations, and the
corresponding trend towards economic concentration inseveral
branches of industries. The theories on contestable markets
and on schumpeterian competition may explain these mixed
trends.
The contestable markets theory addresses the same questions
raised by Coase, but from slightly different perspective.
Instead offocusing onfirms’activities,it is more concerned with
the determination of industry structure. According to this
theory, an industry configuration(i.e., its numberofincumbent
firms, their respective outputvectors, market shares, and price
vectors) results from the interaction of three variables: the
nature of available productive techniques, market size, and
potential competition.
One fundamental conceptin this theory is that of sustainable
configuration. It is “a price vector and a set of output vectors,
one for eachofthefirmsin the configuration, with the following
properties: First, the quantities demanded by the marketat the
prices in question must equal the sum ofthe outputofall the
firms in the configuration. Second,the prices mustyield to each
active firm revenuesthatare no less than the costofproducing
its outputs. And,last, there mustbe no opportunities for entry
that appear profitable to potential entrants who regard the
prices of the incumbent firmsas fixed (Baumolet al., 1982,
p.5).” In otherwords, asustainable configuration “mustminimize
the total cost to the industry of producing the total industry
output. Thatis, no different number,size distribution, outpul
quantities, or productive techniques for the industry's firms
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can provide the industry’s output at a lowertotal cost than that
incurred by thefirms in a sustainable configuration (ibidem,p.
26).”
In contrast with the conventional wisdom, the contestable
markets theory shows that monopolies and oligopolies are, in
many cases, sustainable configurations.In principle, they can
be highly transient, since technical progress, economic growth
and public policies are constantly redefining the sustainability
parameters.Yet, in practice, they frequently are long-lived, as
aircraft, automotive,flat glass, electrical equipment, and several
other manufacturing industries illustrate. The normative
consequences of these features will be discussed in the next
section. But, before that, let us consider other forces that are
affecting concentration in the world economy.
Two outstanding aspects of the current patterns of global
competition are the internationalization of small and medium
firms, and the partition of old multinational corporations into
semi-independent business networks. Coase’s approach
provides, aswehaveseen,aninterpretationfortheseinstitutional
innovations: dueto the sharp declineoftransaction costs,large
firms became superfluousentities for many industries. There
are, of course, countervailing forces in this process, and the
theory on schumpeterian competition indicates one of them:
firms have memory. As Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter
(1982) have shown,when confronted bysimilar market signals,
firms mayreactdifferently, according to their own history of
achievements andfailures. The knowledge acquired from these
experiencesisstoredin the firm’s routines, which do not change
easily. Managerial strategies that warranted leading positions
for decades will not be abandoned without second thoughts,
and the same innovation, assessed as a new technological
paradigm by onefirm, may betreated as a passing fashion by
its competitor. IBM, General Motors, and other symbolsof the
American production system in this century are now immersed
in this type of doubts. Their resistance to adopting new
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decentralization trends, or generate hybrid formsof industrial
organization, wherein, for instance, old administrative layouts
would be combined with updated decision-making procedures.
3. Industrial policy instruments: consistency and efficacy
According to the contestable markets theory, every national
governmentshould have one permanentindustrial policy target,
namely, to ensure conditions of sustainability for all sectors of
the economy.An alternative statementfor this target would be
maximiz regate competitiveness of indus
system, whichis a direct function of the numberofsustainable
configurations operating therein. When a local industry has
such a configuration, the incumbent firms don’t need tariffs,
subsidies, administrative controls, or any other form of
governmental support in orderto face foreign competition in the
home economy. Thus, sustainability is a form of structural
themarket, which is moreefficient than
conventional protectionism, since it doesn’t absorb public
resources, generate rent seeking, nor distort prices.
Evidently, sustainability is the best answer to the industrial
policy dilemma commented uponin section 1. Although just a
theoretical possibility, that will be realized only rarely,ithas two
fundamental merits. The first is to provide a non-ideological
reasoning for industrial policy, avoiding tiresome debates on
“market failure versus bureaucratic action”, “invisible hands
versus special interests”, etc., and, incidently, showing that
Robert Reich (1984) was wrongin his caustic assertion that
“industrial policy is one of those rare ideas that has moved
swiftly from obscurity to meaninglessness without any
intervening period of coherence (p.32).” The second meritis to
set a clear policy target that can be used as a conceptual
framework to evaluate governmental conduct.
In practice, there is a need for industrial policy in two
circumstances:(a) to confer sustainability to an infant industry
that maybe runningunderafeasible configuration only because
 
Textos para DiscussGo
of protection?; and (b) to return to a sustainable configuration
that had lostits status due to technical progressin the rest of
the world, or any othertype of external shock. The former case
is more frequent in developing countries, while thelatter is the
case for industrial restructuring that is typical in OECD
countries. But, in every economy,andin either circumstance,
there is a minimum setof conditions to be provided by the
government. Although non-controversial, this set is not easily
attained, as explainedin the next paragraphs, and is composed
of three permanent requirements.
The first requirement is exchange rate equilibrium, within a
context of macroeconomicstability. This paper does not aim to
discussthe international monetary system andrelated issues,
suchasthe harmonization ofmacroeconomicpolicies. However,
it is necessary lo rememberthat the economy's structure of
effective protection becomes rather uncertain when the real .
exchangerate (RER)is volatile. Local production can be either
overprotected, or exposed to unfair competition from abroad,
depending upon RERswings. Amongotherharmfuleffects, this
instability inhibits long-term contracts betweenlocal firms and
independentforeign counterparts, due to the high risks involved
in suchtype ofoperation. Togetherwith intra-firm trade, these
contracts form thecore ofintra-industry trade, whichis a basic
source of dynamism of contemporary world trade. In other
words, RERinstability raises transaction costs and precludes
the realization of the benefits generated by technical progress
in the computer and lelecommunication industries.
The second requirement is symmetry betwee
n the demand
uponpublic resourcesand the State taxation power. T
hesize
and composition ofpublic investment mayvary accordingt
o the
peculiarities of each economy, but the headings are similar
everywhere: defense, education, infrastructure, science an
d
technology, social security, and welfare. These expenditures
play twostrategic roles as industrial policy instruments. Th
e
first is keynesian, by preserving a foreseeable dema
nd source
that equips local producers with better
conditions to face
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market oscillations. This means lowerlevels of p
lanned idle
capacity, and, consequently, smaller unit costs. The s
econdis
schumpeterian, throughthe public support to R & D
activities,
the ultimate growth sourceof industrial capitalism.
In an open economy,the maintenanceofan adequate and non
-
inflationary level of public investment requires a fiscal s
ystem
that is able to reconcile international competitiven
ess and
social fairness with a heavy tax burden. This implies alo
ng run
fiscal policy systematically committed to reducing tax
rates and
to enlarging the tax base, objectives that only
becomefeasible
when education and incomedistribution are permanent
national
top priorities. As table 1 indicates, the capacity
to meet this
challenge is, nowadays, a fundamental attrib
ution that
differentiates advanced fromdeveloping countries. On average
,
between 1981 and 1988, the tax burden jumped from
41.3 to
44.4 percent ofGDP inthe European Communily, and remai
ned
around 36percentin the OECD countries. In contr
ast, among
the six largest Latin American economies, only Chile h
as been
able to keep a performancesimilar to the OECD patte
rn, albeit
far from the Europeanlevels.
The third requirement to be attained within an i
ndustrial
strategy is the provision of an institutional framework to
regulate the competition process. Recently, the Industry
Development Division al the World Bank presented a
comprehensive approach onthis subject (see Atiyas el al.,
1992), covering the whole set ofpolicy and institutional measures
that would ensure a competitive environment to modern
economies. Three types of measures are proposed therein:
those that strengthen discipline, enhance mobility and improve
the availability of resources. One basic assumptionis that these
measures“are strictly complementary to eachother. Emphasis
on oneset of measures to the neglectof the othersis likely to
be ineffective, or at worst, counter-productive. Hence when
resourcesare notavailable and mobility is restricted, increased
discipline may aggravate financial distress, which, in turn, may




Tax Burden In Latin America and in OECD Countries
(Governmentrevenueas a percentage of GDP)
 
Country 1981 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Argentina 26.0 22.7 23.1 28.0 28.1 26.5 23.4
Australia 319 32.4 33.3 33.7 34.4 342 33.6
Austria 478 46.7 47.5 485 482 47.8 46.8
Belgium 43.4 45.1 456 45.9 45.1 45.8 44.3
Brazil 23.9 23.5 228 23.4 264 25.0 23.8
Canada 38.5 39.1 38.7 38.7 39.5 396 40.4
Chile 328 324 336 359 35.0 34.5 38.2
elombics 169 181 195 209 23.4 220 216Denmark 52.1 512 55.5 585 583 59.2 59.5
France 45.1 459 475 47.6 47.1 47.6 47.1Gennany 448 454 453 456 44.9 44.4 43.7
oa 29.1 323 348 346 35.7 36.9 35.1
Sefer 34.1 35.9 37.4 38.0 39.0 39.3 39.9Mercy 29.1 29.5 30.4 12 315 33.4 343
Nether! 208 236 236 247 936 246 243
Norway 53.5 53.8 54.1 54.3 53.0 53.4 52.2
Portugal 518 51.9 53.0 55.1 54.7 53.7 “
Spain 333 35.4 373 359 376 ...
Sweden 31.2 314 332 945 350 -
United Kingdom 424 58.3 59.2 59.2 60.7 61.8
United States" 3,14 220 423 423 41:5 40.7 3
Venezuela 361 cri 307 312 314 31.9 at
EEC Average 413 34.5 37.2 310 995 30.4 |
OECD Average 35,5 42.2 430 433 431 43.9 4 i






soe Outlook, Historical Statistics (Paris, 1990)
¥ of Latin America and the Caribbean.
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environment, government's intentions to strengthendiscipline
mayin fact not be credible ex-ante. Similarly, an environment
with ample resourcesbutinsufficientdisciple is likely to result
in their inefficient allocation and use(Atiyasetal., p.3).”
Thediscussionin section 2 suggests an additional assumption,
that those measures should be convergent with the natural
trends prevailing in the industrial system. Hence, industry
decentralization should be stimulated wheneverthe ratio of
productioncosts/transactioncosts is raising, and, consequently,
the compelilivenessofthe “intelligent” enterprisesis improving;
but, the restructuring of sustainable monopolies or oligopolies
should neverbe forced. As Baumol(1982) observed,“a history
of absenceof entry in an industry and a high concentration
index maybe signsofvirtue, notof vice (p.14).”
When an industry has a contestable configuration, no
governmental intervention is necessary, since the discipline
imposed by potential competitorsis sufficient to preserve the
public interest®. However, non-contestable,
but
sustainable,
configurations need careful monitoring. This is the case where
incumbentfirms control a new technology thatis not accessible
to potential entrants. The history of the flat-glass industry in
the 1960s is a goodillustration of such a case, as I have
described elsewhere (Tavares de Araujo, 1982).
Since the 1930s, the flat-glass industry was an international
oligopoly organized under the leadership of four firms: one
British (Pilkington), one French(Saint Gobain), and twoAmerican
(Pittsburgh Plate Glass and Libbey-Owens-Ford). In 1959, after
Several years of R & D investments, Pilkington introduced the
“float-process”, an innovation that revolutionized the industry's
lechnological base. During the following decade, thal firm’s
main sourceofprofils was the income earned from licensing the
float-process to other competitors, and entry into the industry
Wasrestricted to those firms that paid royalties to Pilkington.
This situation called the attention of the British Monopolies
Commission, which conducted an invesUgation toverifywhether
13
Textos para Discussdo
Pilkington’s behavior was affecting the public interest, Theconclusions, published in the Reporton the SupplyofFlat Glass(1968), were amply favorable to Pilkington, for the followingreasons:(a) during the 1960s,in the United Kingdom,the priceofflat glass always remained below the wholesale price indexesfor the manufacturing industry; (b) Pilkington’s exportperformance and technologicalleadership were highly beneficial_ to the British economy.
4, National interests and global trade
The preceding section indicated the permanentfeatures thatevery industrial policy musthave.It is important to stress that,with the partial exception of exchangerate Stability, all thosefeatures are strictly domestic affairs. The rest of the world cannever be blamed when a national government is unable toProvide them.In fact, the demarcation of a sharp border-linebetween homework and international bargaining is a basicprerequisite to any meaningful negotiating strategy that wouldreconcile national interests andglobal trade.AsLauraD'AndreaTyson (1992) pointed out, “ultimately, the fate of the nation'shigh-technology industries dependsnoton the trade battles wefight abroad but on the choices we make at home: inmacroeconomic policy, education policy, technology policy, andindustrial policy (p.296).”
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Pneed “dby anindustry. Moreover, someone mustpayfor the
o ott’ tion costs which will be shared amonglocal consum
ers
and foreign producers, depending upon the particular type
instrumentbeing used.
findustrial policy contains a clear
metoootcoue:everygovernment is sovereign to protect
anyindt stry, but the costs should be entirely kept inside the
vevionalborders. There are several instruments that meet|t
his
rule For instance,a“voluntary exportrestraint WER)agree
me nt
th t aises prices in the importing country's domes
‘et to
ch extent that it is both sufficient to protect the ie ;
Oe ity and preservethetrading partners’ export potential.
In
thiscase the rents generated by the protectionist measure
are
sha cdbetweenthe domesticindustry andtheforeignsup
p lers,
aexpense of local consumers. Another instrum
en betdy
reconciles local protection with foreign interestsasub
that equalizes domestic prices to international s .
In the literature on thepolitical economyofAhseethat needfrequent cases are infant industries and those stitvenoss,
restructuring in orderto recoverinternation?relea third caseNonetheless, asTyson (1992) documented, OECD countries:thatis emerging as the mostimportant eeare.this is the oldestthe high-technology industries. To be sure, trial capitalism.
type of protectionism in the history of indus R olution theThroughoutthe period ofthefirst Industrial f ce ital goodsBritish government prohibited the exports 0 Suntil 1824),(until 1843) and the emigration of skilled artisans a echanical
with the explicit intention ofpreservingthe secrets oBee 1980).
engineering under British producers’ control (set ©.ection
Afterwards, the methods becamelessnaive, but Ppoperate
ofthe schumpeterian rents accruing to those firmstheseental
at the technological frontier remained a priority instance, inaffair in every advanced economy. Nowadays,!o ’
15
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the aircraft engine industry, as the U.S N
Engineering (1991) certifies, “in addition tobelne|thewrinepat
sourceoftechnology funds, the U.S. government imposestight
‘xport rontrols on what are deemed to be the most advanced
rect ‘0 ogles. not necessarily limited to those contained in the
; st military systems. Restrictions imposed by security
acarance requirements for personnel working on classified
r tary programs practically exclude using engineers who are
oreignnationals.Agovernmentpolicyrequiring thatdependence
on foreign sourcesforraw materials or finished parts b
a minimum is somewhatmoreflexible (p.95).”
parts be keptto
As lhe GATT's regulations do notcoverthis type of rotection,
eeBovernments created special forms ofvaniaged trade to
cee an emational conflicts in this area. One outstanding
exal np was € agreementsigned in 1986 by the United States
and Pe 1 on the semiconductor industry. As Tyson (1992)rved, “the accord was a first in many respects. It was the
first major US trade agreementina high-technology, strategic
industry,oan and thefirst one motivated by concerns aboutthe loss
technology competitivenessr.atherthanconcerns aboutemployment. It was the first US trade agreement dedicated tompovin
B
arket access abroad rather than restricting it atome alike Previous bilateral trade deals, it attempted toother ulate ©notonlyin tneUnited States and Japan butin
well.
It
was the firstoemplywiththacatened trade Sanctions on Japanforfailureto
erms of a trade
agreementsignalled several major shiftsinUStradewe” hatwere to characterize the rest of the decade - shifts tendaggressive unilateralism, conditional reciprocity, and m ain
trade by results as well as by rules (p.109).” anaging
According to Tyson, despite the progre
Uruguay Round, GATT's ruleswill remaintoogeneral, without
addressing the peculiarities offrontier technologies: “Whatev
finally emerges from the Uruguay Round negotiationsis ot
likely to solve all the problemsofcontrolling industrial targeting
16
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and subsidies in high-technology industries (1992,
p.284).”
Furthermore, “American policy makers must recogni
ze that
developing the necessary rules will be a slow process
. In the
meantime, the United Stateswill continue to face the c
hallenge
of preventing further erosion in its relative economic
position
(p.296).” For this, she recommendsthat instrument
s like the
1986 semiconductor trade agreement should be kept as k
ey
elements ofthe USforeign policy untill the convenient mult
ilateral
rules are put in place.
These contentions are only partially correct. There is no do
ubt
that, when an industry has a sustainable oligopolist
configuration, and is establishedin only two or three countries,
the international rules must be formulated through direct
negotiations among those countries and according to the
features of the competition process prevailing in that industry.
Theserules will hardly be enduring, since technical progressis
constantly changingthe formsofcompetition, as schumpeterian
theories explain. Hence, mechanismslike the semiconductor
agreementwill always be necessary and under a permanent
updating process. But, they can never be substitutes for the
GATT,whoseroleis to provide the overall regulatory framework
for those sectoral agreements.
Nowadays, in order to be prepared for reconciling conflicts
between domestic policies and international interests, the
GATT’slegislation needs just two small amendments. Thefirst
is to make explicit the principle that every nation is free to
promote its industries whenever the protection cosis are
exclusively paid by that society. In fact, this norm is already
implicit in the draft of the Code on Safeguards that has been
agreed upon at the Uruguay Round,butnotyet formalized. |
That Code will introduce a majorinstitutional innovation, by
legitimizing nearly all managed trade practices Invented by
OECDcountriesin recent decades, and keeping such practices
under GATT’s supervision. Since there is consensus on the
Substance of that principle, the only missing detail is to
emphasize that protection rule in the Code’s final draft.
7
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The second amendmentis a balanced Treaty on IntellectualProperty Rights, that would protect the intercats of those whocreate technical progress, but without artificially raising theentry barriers into high-technology industries. Considering the1986 deadlock situation, when some developing countries were
against negotiating this topic within the GATT, the present
version ofthe text is a great achievement, althoughstill biased
- towards the innovators’ side.
It became a common Place to say that the GATT’s current
negotiating agenda is too large. Nevertheless, the Code onSafeguards and the Treaty on Intellectual Property Rights,if
drafted according to the formats suggested above, are the
rullestones thatwill pave thewayforsettling the other remaining
ues.
5. Conclusion
This paper’s argument can be summarized by recalling a
comment made byJohn Stuart Mill some 150 years ago: “There
are some things with which governments oughtnot to meddle,
and other things with which they ought; but whetherright or
wrongin itself, the interference must workforill, ifgovernment,
not understanding the subject which it meddles with, meddles
are about a result which would be mischievous (1848,
p. ”
Within the context framed by the contemporary dilemma of
industrial policy, governments ought to meddle with four
things: Thefirst is exchange rate steady equilibrium,that may
demand somesupranational efforts regardingthe harmonization
ofnational macroeconomicpolicies, as I have argued elsewhere
(Tavares de Araujo, 1992). The second is to maintain a tax
system that is compatible with the levels of public investment
required by the current international patterns of technical
progress and welfare. The third is to monitor the conductofthe
business community, but under the normative parameters
indicated by the structural characteristics ofeach industry,i.e.,
18
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the ratio of production costs/transaction costs, the nature of
entrybarriers, and the interplaybetween the existingtechnologies
and the market size. The fourth is to pursue an international
negotiating strategythat, on the one hand, would avoid injuring
the performance of other economies, but, on the other hand,
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1-This paperts partofastudyonTheTransformation ofIndustrialization
Policies in Small Latin American Countries, organized by Pitou Van
Dijck, from the Center for Latin American Research and Documentation
(CEDLA), Amsterdam,and Ruud Buttelaar,fron the Economic Commission
for Lan America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santlago.
2- An industry configuration Is feasible when all incumbent firms can
serve the market without running into losses. Feasibility 1s a weaker
requirement than sustainability, since It doesn’t require that the
configuration be the most efficent one (see Baumol el al., 1982, pp. 24/
25).
3- Baumoletal. (1982) define a perfectly contestable markel“as one that
Is accessible to potential entrants and has thefollowing two propertles:
First, the potential entrants can, without restriction, serve the same
market demands and use the same productive techniques as those
available to the incumbentfirms. Thus,there are no entry barriers In the
senseofthe termused by Stigler. Second,the potential entrants evaluate
the profitability of entry at the incumbent firm's pre-entry prices. Thal Is,
although the potential entrants recognize that an expansionof Industry
outputs leadsto lowerprices- In accord with the market demand curves
- the entrants nevertheless assumethatif they undercut Incumbents’
prices they can sell as muchofthe corresponding good as the quantity
demanded by the market at their ownprices (p.5).”
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